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Abstract
We present a comparison between the Cournot and the Supply Func-
tion Equilibrium models under linear price/demand, linear supply func-
tions and quadratic costs.
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1 Introduction
The Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) approach in an electric market
takes place whenever ﬁrms compete in oﬀering a schedule of quantities and
prices. On the other hand, in the Cournot equilibrium model each ﬁrm chooses
the optimal output by maximizing its own proﬁt. It is well known that Cournot
equilibrium is easier to compute than SFE because the mathematical struc-
ture of Cournot models turns out to be a set of algebraic equations, while
the mathematical structure of SFE models turns out to be a set of diﬀerential
equations (see e.g. Ventosa et al. [7]).
Bonenti and Zuanon [2] considered a simpliﬁed version of the Cournot
equilibrium model under linear price/demand and quadratic costs presented by
Ruiz et al. [5]. In particular, they presented the explicit expressions character-
izing analytically the Cournot equilibrium values for the produced quantities,
the market-clearing price and the proﬁts whenever each generating company
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is characterized by a quadratic cost function and the price/demand function
is linear.
In this paper, we consider the Supply Function Equilibrium in case that
the supply functions si(p) = ηip are also linear and there are no other con-
straints. Starting from the linear demand function D(p) = p−γ
β
, we use the
classical ﬁrst-order (unconstrained) optimality conditions (see e.g. Klemperer
and Meyer [4] and Anderson and Hu [1]) at the market clearing price in order
to determine the explicit expressions for the produced quantities, the optimal
price and the proﬁts. Finally, we make a comparison between the two models
in the spirit of the considerations presented by Willems and Rumiantseva [8].
2 Comparison between Equilibrium a` la Cournot
and Supply function equilibrium
In the Cournot approach, n generating companies are considered, each of
them producing a quantity of energy qi. While each generating company af-
fects the market-clearing price, it is assumed that the production level of any
generator does not depend on the production levels of the remaining compa-
nies.
The generic i-th generating company is characterized by a quadratic cost
function Ci(qi) deﬁned as follows:
Ci(qi) = ai +
1
2
biq
2
i ,(1)
where the real parameters ai and bi are positive.
It is further assumed that the price/demand function (i.e., the inverse de-
mand function) p(q1 + ... + qn) is linear, i.e.
p(q1 + ... + qn) = γ + β(q1 + ... + qn)(2)
with γ > 0 and β < 0, the following “simultaneous” maximum proﬁt
problem comes into consideration:
maxp, qi πi = p(q1 + ... + qn)qi − Ci(qi) =
maxp, qi
[
(γ + β(q1 + ... + qn))qi − ai − 1
2
biq
2
i
]
i = 1, ..., n,(3)
where πi is the proﬁt that is obtained by the i-th company.
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Explicit solutions of problem (3) are obtained by considering the system of
the partial derivatives of the proﬁts equal to zero:
∂πi
∂qi
= γ + β
∑
j =i
qj + qi(2β − bi) = γ + β
n∑
j=1
qj + qi(β − bi) =
= p(
n∑
j=1
qj) + qi(β − bi) = 0 i = 1, ..., n.(4)
Ruiz, Conejo, Garc´ia-Bertrand [Electric Power System Research 78 (2008)]
provide a nice expression of the solutions of system (4) (see also Bonenti and
Zuanon [2]).
Indeed, the optimal quantities qCi to be produced, the market-clearing price
pC and the proﬁts πCi are determined as follows:
qCi =
γ
β(
1
β
−
n∑
j=1
1
bj − β
)
(bi − β)
i = 1, ..., n,(5)
pC =
γ
β
1
β
−
n∑
j=1
1
bj − β
,(6)
πCi =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
γ
β(
1
β
−
n∑
j=1
1
bj − β
)
(bi − β)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
2
(
bi
2
− β
)
− ai i = 1, ..., n.(7)
Let us now turn to the Supply Function Equilibrium in case that the supply
functions
si(p) = ηip (i = 1, ..., n)(8)
are linear and there are no other constraints (see e.g. Gao and Sheble [3]).
We consider the linear demand function (i.e,, precisely the inverse of (2))
D(p) =
p− γ
β
(9)
and we assume that the cost functions are quadratic and expressed precisely
by conditions (1).
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We recall that ﬁrst-order (unconstrained) optimality conditions are the
following (see Klemperer and Meyer [4] and Anderson and Hu [1]):
si(p) = [p− C ′i(si(p))]
[∑
j =i
s′j(p)−D′(p)
]
i = 1, ..., n,(10)
at the market clearing price p, i.e., whenever
si(p) = D(p)−
∑
j =i
sj(p) i = 1, 2, ..., n.(11)
It is immediate to check that the system of equations (10) is equivalent to the
following one:
ηi = [1− biηi]
[∑
j =i
ηj − 1
β
]
i = 1, ..., n.(12)
On the other hand, from the expressions (8) and (9) of the supply functions
and respectively the demand function and the market clearing conditions (11),
we immediately recover the following expression for the price:
pSFE =
γ
β
1
β
−
n∑
j=1
ηj
(13)
The following proposition is an immediate consequence of a comparison
between (6) and (13).
Proposition 1 The optimal prices pC and pSFE are equal if and only if
the following condition holds:
n∑
j=1
1
bj − β =
n∑
j=1
ηj .(14)
We recall that a case of particular relevance occurs whenever all but one the
supply functions are zero. This means that there exists a generating company
i such that ηi = 0 and
∑
j =i ηj = 0. In this case company i is acting as a
monopoly and the system (12) reduces to the following equation:
ηi =
1
bi − β .(15)
The following proposition summarizes the monopolistic situation in the
supply function equilibrium approach.
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Proposition 2 If company i is acting as a monopoly, then
pSFE =
γ
β
1
β
− 1
bi−β
,(16)
si(p
SFE) =
γ
β
( 1
β
− 1
bi−β )(bi − β)
= qCi .(17)
On the other hand, easy computations preclude the choices ηi =
1
bi−β for
i = 1, ..., n, which seem to be naturally suggested by the consideration of
the condition (14). Indeed, such a substitution would imply a monopoly with∑
j =i
1
bj − β = 0 but this condition is impossible. Therefore, the following propo-
sition holds.
Proposition 3 It is never the case that
ηi =
1
bi − β i = 1, ..., n
is a solution of the system (12).
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